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In this paper, we propose a two-country, two sector monetary union DSGE model with housing.
One of the countries is calibrated to represent the Spanish economy while the other one is the rest
of the European monetary union. First, we illustrate how looser credit conditions coming from the
Euro area, together with increases in housing demand, lead to an increase in house prices and credit
in Spain. Then, we analyze to what extent, macroprudential policies could have avoided the excess
in credit that triggered the nancial crisis in Spain. We 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"[...] Dynamic provisioning did make banks stronger than would otherwise have been the case, and
there is some suggestive evidence that it moderated the credit boom as well. Whether the Bank of Spains
response was proportional to the challenge, or more should have been done, remains a matter of debate".
Jaime Caruana, 2012.
1 Introduction
The recent crisis in Spain had its center in the housing sector. Easier borrowing conditions together
with speculative housing demand gave rise to a housing bubble that burst, bringing a strong recession.
Spain accession to the Euro area delivered unprecedented low interest rates, in part due to the good
performance of its Euro partners. This, together with a strong housing demand, brought a house price
and credit boom in Spain that was the seed of the crisis.
However, some macroprudential measures were taken by the Bank of Spain before the crisis in order
to palliate this credit boom, namely the so-called dynamic provisioning. The e¤ect of provisioning
has been found to have had only a small impact on credit growth, while being useful in building up
countercyclical bu¤ers to strengthen the solvency of banks. While macroprudential measures seem to be
e¤ective as preventive tools, in this case, it did not seem to be enough to avoid the crisis.
In this paper, we propose a two-country, two-sector monetary union DSGE model with housing and
collateral constraints, allowing for cross-country di¤erences in mortgage and housing markets as well as
asymmetric shocks. One of the countries is calibrated to represent the Spanish economy while the other
one is the rest of the European monetary union.
First, we illustrate how looser credit conditions coming from the Euro area monetary policy and
housing demand shocks lead to an increase in house prices and credit in Spain. Then, we analyze to what
extent, an optimal implementation of macroprudential policies could have avoided the excess in credit
that triggered the nancial crisis in Spain. In particular, we analyze the implementation of a rule on the
LTV ratio, as an alternative or a complement of the dynamic provisioning tool that was put in place. We
propose an implementation of this macroprudential policy which is analogous to how monetary policy
is conducted. We assume that the same way that the central bank follows a Taylor rule for monetary
policy, the macroprudential authority also follows a linear rule to carry out the macroprudential policy,
using the LTV as an instrument. The monetary policy literature has extensively shown that simple rules
result in a good performance; therefore it seems sensible to apply this kind of rule to macroprudential
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supervision (See Yellen, 2010).1 We consider a rule for the LTV ratio which responds to deviations of
credit from its steady state. In this way, booms that lead to an increase in borrowing are moderated.2
Even if the topic of dynamic provisioning and macroprudential tools in Spain has already been
studied, it is the rst time that it is studied in a DSGE framework. Furthermore, within this setting,
we are able to provide optimal parameters for an LTV macroprudential tool as well as the welfare gain
from introducing this measure. This is a novel and worthwhile contribution of our paper.
The basic modelling framework follows Rubio (2014), to which we add macroprudential measures.
In each country, there is a group of individuals that are credit constrained and need housing collateral
to obtain loans. Countries trade goods, and savers in each country have access to foreign assets. We
obtain the optimal combination of LTV rule reaction parameters that maximizes welfare for Spain, given
monetary policy.
This paper relates to di¤erent strands of the literature. The model constitutes a two-country, two-
sector version of the seminal paper of Iacoviello (2005), that introduces a nancial accelerator that
works through the housing sector, in the avor of Aspachs and Rabanal (2010). However, it introduces
cross-country housing-market heterogeneity as in Rubio (2014). This paper is also related to the recent
literature on macroprudential and monetary policies in Iacoviello-type models such in the aforementioned
Kannan, Rabanal and Scott (2012) or Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2014). However, the novelty of this
paper is that it explores the issue for the specic case of Spain, one of the few countries in which some
macroprudential policies have been already implemented before the crisis. The model is appropriately
calibrated to reect the basic features of the Spanish economy, that is, an LTV that is larger than the
average, variable-rate mortgages, a 10% relative size, and higher housing wealth to GDP.
Results show that low interest rates, coming either from a monetary policy shock or from a produc-
tivity shock in the Euro area, can explain the credit boom in Spain that preceded the crisis. However,
this alone cannot account for the strong increase in house prices in this country. Loose credit conditions
must be combined with a housing demand shock in order to explain both the credit boom and the
increase in house prices. We also nd that a macroprudential rule that decreases LTVs in booms would
have moderated the credit boom. We nd the optimal LTV rule that maximizes welfare for the Spanish
1We can nd other examples of LTV rules in the literature. Funke and Paetz (2012) use a non-linear rule on the LTV
and nds that it can help reduce the transmission of house price cycles to the real economy. In a similar way, Kannan,
Rabanal and Scott (2012) examine a monetary policy rule that reacts to prices, output and changes in collateral values with
a macroprudential instrument based on the LTV. Lambertini et al (2013) allow for the implementation of both interest-rate
and LTV policies in a model with news shocks.
2The IMF (2013) states that a macroeconomic environment which gives rise to credit growth will contribute to the
build-up of systemic risk.
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economy. These results can also be applied to other countries facing similar problems in the housing
sector and thinking about implementing macroprudential policies.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the Spanish experience before the crisis. Section
3 describes the model. Section 4 presents the simulations. Section 5 introduces the macroprudential
policies. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Spanish Experience
After entering the Euro area and preceding the crisis, Spain experienced one of the most important
housing booms among developed economies. This housing boom was one of the main engines for economic
growth in Spain.3 The economies of di¤erent countries have been a¤ected with di¤erent degrees of
intensity according to their exposure to some of the main drivers of the nancial crisis. The excessive
dependence of the real estate industry, jointly with a softening of the credit standards and variable rate
mortgages caused that economic and nancial crisis hit Spain more severely than to other developed
economies.
The introduction of the Euro eliminated intra-Euro Area currency risk and also led to a convergence
of Spanish interest rates to the lower interest rates in the Euro zone. Before the launch of the Euro,
Spanish nominal interest rates were markedly higher than the rest of Europe. The common currency led
to a convergence of Spanish nominal rates to Euro Area rates. The average Spanish government interest
rate (interest payments/sovereign debt stock) fell from around 9% in the late 1990s to below 4% by 2010
(See Figure A1 in the Appendix). In this paper, we proxy the convergence to lower interest rate by a
negative interest-rate shock.
Furthermore, improvements in productivity in the big countries of the Euro area contributed to a
lower interest rate, following the needs of the majority (See gure A2 in the Appendix). However, even
though Spains productivity was not improving, it benetted from the lower interest rates stemming
from a single monetary policy. In fact, according to In t Veld et al. (2014), in Spain, the boom saw
strong growth in the employment of unskilled labor that was also fuelled by immigration. Hence, average
Spanish labor productivity and measured TFP fell during the boom years. Mora-Sanguinetti and Fuentes
(2014) and Peeters and den Reijer (2014) also nd that the Spanish economy experienced signicantly
weaker labour productivity growth than other OECD economies and failed to catch up with the most
3See Akin et al. (2014).
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advanced economies in the period 1996-2007. Nevertheless, Spain, a relatively small country in a larger
monetary union (accounting for about 10% of the total size) had limited capacity to undertake policies
to accommodate shocks and the interest rate was driven by the most productive countries. Within the
modelling framework, we approximate this productivity di¤erential that lead to lower interest rates in
the Euro area with an idiosyncratic productivity shock that hit the monetary union except Spain.
Two other factors that may have caused the boom in the Spanish economy were loosening credit
conditions, and asset bubbles. Akin et al (2011) estimate that these three factors all fuelled a sharp
rise in Spanish investment and house prices, and increased the fragility of the balance sheets of Spanish
households and non-nancial rms. Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2013) also nd that interest rate
convergence mattered for Spain, but asset bubbles and the loosening of credit constraints for households
and rms had a more pronounced role. 4 As a consequence, real house prices (relative to the GDP
deator) rose by 80% between 2001 and 2008. Thus, clearly a housing bubble developed in Spain, before
the crisis. Moro and Nuño (2012) nd that the house price di¤erential between Spain and Germany was
mainly demand driven.5 In our model, the asset bubble in Spain is approximated by a housing demand
shock.
However, given its inability of cope with these problems within the monetary union setting, the
Bank of Spain made use of alternative policies in order to counteract the boom, namely macroprudential
policies. Spain was pioneer on the use of countercyclical bu¤ers; it implemented a macroprudential tool
called dynamic provisioning. Nevertheless, despite these regulatory constraints, Spain could not avoid a
credit and housing bubble.
Macroprudential policies are particularly relevant in the context of monetary unions given that
monetary policy alone cannot be used to stabilize the economy of a particular member if the economy is
hit by an asymmetric shock or when there are structural di¤erences across members.6 Therefore, they
are very important for a case like the Spanish one. First, productivity shocks were hitting its partners
more strongly. Second, housing demand shocks were more important in Spain, as it has previously
been previously exposed. And, nally, common interest rate shocks were transmitted more strongly to
Spanish households due to variable-rate mortgages and higher LTVs.7
As a result, the Bank of Spain, which is also the Spanish banking supervisory authority, implemented
4See Shirai (2014) or Diemer and Vollmer (2015) about loosening of credit constraints in Japan in recent years.
5 In Spain, house prices more than doubled in the decade 19972007 whereas in Germany, house prices fell by more than
10% after 2003.
6See Jeanne and Korinek (2014)
7See Rubio (2011).
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the countercyclical dynamic provisioning tool in 2000 to ght against a sharp increase in credit risk on
Spanish banks balance sheets following a period of signicant credit growth during the late 1990s.8
Dynamic provisions are now counted as a macroprudential tool, at the time they were implemented
with the idea that banks should build up a bu¤er in good times to be used in bad times to protect its
solvency.9 However, even though they contribute to mitigate the credit boom, dynamic provisions, on
their own, did not su¢ ce to cope with all the credit losses of the downturn. A macroprudential tool
like this one should have been accompanied probably by other countercyclical tools, specially for the
Spanish housing sector. For instance, despite the provisioning, LTVs were still very high, contributing
to increasing bank risk. Using the LTV as a countercyclical tool to avoid excessive growth could have
been an alternative or a complement of dynamic provisioning. The housing price is one of the indicators
selected jointly with credit to estimate the nancial cycle and it is almost always included in the group
of leading indicators of banking crisis, so it makes sense to consider it as an indicator to change LTVs
(Claessens et al., 2011). In this paper, we study the optimality of this policy to soften credit cycles by
proposing a countercyclical rule for the LTV that mainly responds to house prices.
3 Model Setup
We consider an innite-horizon, two-country, two-sector economy inside a monetary union. The home
country (Spain) is denoted by SP and the rest of the union by EUR. Households consume, work, and
demand real estate. There is a nancial intermediary in each country that provides mortgages and accepts
deposits from consumers. Each country produces one di¤erentiated intermediate good, but households
consume goods from both countries. For simplicity, housing is a non-traded good. We assume that labor
is immobile across the countries. Firms follow a standard Calvo problem. In this economy, both nal
and intermediate goods are produced. Prices are sticky in the intermediate-goods sector. There is a
construction sector that produces houses. Monetary policy is conducted by a single central bank that
responds to a weighted average of ination in both countries. There is a rule to the LTV which serves
as a macroprudential measure. We allow for housing-market heterogeneity across the countries.
8See Saurina (2011)
9Jiménez and Saurina (2006).
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3.1 The Consumers Problem
There are three types of consumers in each country: unconstrained consumers; constrained consumers
who borrow at a variable rate; and constrained consumers who borrow at a xed rate. The proportion of
each type of borrower is xed and exogenous.10 Consumers can be constrained or unconstrained in the
sense that constrained individuals need to collateralize their debt repayments in order to borrow from
the nancial intermediary. Interest payments in the next period cannot exceed a proportion of the future
value of the current house stock. In this way, the nancial intermediary ensures that borrowers are going
to be able to fulll their debt obligations in the next period. As in Iacoviello (2005), we assume that
constrained consumers are more impatient than unconstrained ones.11 There is a nancial intermediary
in each country. The nancial intermediary in SP accepts deposits from domestic savers, and it extends
both xed- and variable-rate loans to domestic borrowers.
3.1.1 Unconstrained Consumers (Savers)
Unconstrained consumers in SP maximize as follows:
max E0
1X
t=0
t

lnCut + j lnH
u
t  
(Lut )



; (1)
Here, E0 is the expectation operator,  2 (0; 1) is the discount factor, and Cut , Hut , and Lut are consump-
tion at t, the stock of housing, and hours worked, respectively.12 j represents the weight of housing in
the utility function. 1= (   1) is the aggregate labor-supply elasticity.
Consumption is a bundle of domestically and foreign-produced goods, dened as: Cut = (C
u
SPt)
n (CuEURt)
1 n ;
where n is the size of SP. Unconstrained consumers provide labor to both the consumption and con-
struction sector, so that Lut =
h
(Luct)
1  + (Luht)
1 
i 1
1 
:
The budget constraint for SP is as follows:
10As in Rubio (2011), we leave this porportion xed an exogenous. According to the European Mortgage Federation, the
type of mortgage contracts across countries responds to a large extent to institutional or cultural factors, which are out
of the scope of the present model. In the short run, the proportion of each type of mortgage contract can uctuate, but
typically it does not imply a change in the xed- or variable-rate category of the country.
11This assumption ensures that the borrowing constraint is binding in the steady state and that the economy is endoge-
nously split into borrowers and savers.
12 It is assumed that housing services are proportional to the housing stock.
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PSPtC
u
SPt + PEURtC
u
EURt +QSPtH
u
t +RSPt 1B
u
t 1 +Rt 1Dt 1 +
 
2
D2t  QSPtHut 1+
W uctL
u
ct +W
u
htL
u
ht +B
u
t +Dt + PSPtFt + PSPtSt; (2)
where PSPt and PEURt are the prices of the goods produced in Countries SP and EUR, respectively,
Qt is the housing price in SP, and W uct and W
u
ht are the consumption and housing sector wages for
unconstrained consumers. But represents domestic bonds denominated in the common currency. RSPt is
the nominal interest rate in SP. Positive bond holdings signify borrowing, and negative signify savings.
However, as we will see, this group will choose not to borrow at all: they are the savers in this economy.
Dt are foreign-bond holdings by savers in SP.13 Rt is the nominal rate of foreign bonds, which are
denominated in euros. As is common in the literature, to ensure stationarity of net foreign assets we
introduce a small quadratic cost of deviating from zero foreign borrowing,  2D
2
t .
14 Savers obtain interest
on their savings. St and Ft are lump-sum prots received from the rms and the nancial intermediary
in SP, respectively.
Dividing by PSPt, we can rewrite the budget constraint in terms of goods SP:
CuSPt+
PEURt
PSPt
CuEURt+qSPtH
u
t +
RSPt 1but 1
SPt
+
Rt 1dt 1
PSPt
+
 
2
d2t  qSPtHut 1+wuctLuct+wuhtLuht+but +dt+Ft+St;
(3)
where SPt denotes ination for the goods produced in SP, dened as PSPt=PSPt 1:
Maximizing (1) subject to (3) ; we obtain the rst-order conditions for the unconstrained group:
CuSPt
CuEURt
=
nPEURt
(1  n)PSPt (4)
1
CuSPt
= Et

RSPt
SPt+1CuSPt+1

; (5)
1   dt
CuSPt
= Et

Rt
SPt+1CuSPt+1

; (6)
13Savers have access to international nancial markets.
14See Iacoviello and Smets (2006) for a similar specication of the budget constraint.
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wuct = (L
u
t )
 1 (Luct)
 
h
(Luct)
1  + (Luht)
1 
i 
1  CuSPt
n
; (7)
wuht = (L
u
t )
 1 (Luht)
 
h
(Luct)
1  + (Luht)
1 
i 
1  CuSPt
n
; (8)
j
Hut
=
n
CuAPt
qSPt   Et n
CuSPt+1
qSPt+1: (9)
Equation (4) equates the marginal rate of substitution between goods to the relative price. Equation (5)
is the Euler equation for consumption. Equation (6) is the rst-order condition for net foreign assets.
Equations (7) and (8)are the labor-supply conditions for both sectors. These equations are standard.
Equation (9) is the Euler equation for housing and states that at the margin the benets from consuming
housing have to be equal to the costs.
Combining (5) and (6) we obtain a non-arbitrage condition between home and foreign bonds:15
RSPt =
Rt
(1   dt) : (10)
Since all consumption goods are traded and there are no barriers to trade, we assume in this paper
that the law of one price holds:
PSPt = P

SPt; (11)
where variables with a star denote foreign variables.
3.1.2 Constrained Consumers (Borrowers)
Constrained consumers in SP are of two types: those who borrow at a variable rate and those who do
so at a xed rate. The di¤erence between them is the interest rate they are charged. The variable-
rate constrained consumer faces RSPt, which will coincide with the rate set by the central bank. The
xed-rate borrower pays RSPt, derived from the nancial intermediarys problem. The proportion of
variable-rate consumers in Country SP is constant and exogenous and is equal to SP 2 [0; 1].
15The log-linearized version of this equation could be interpreted as the uncovered interest-rate parity.
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Constrained consumers are more impatient than unconstrained ones, that is e < . Constrained
consumers face a collateral constraint: the expected debt repayment in the next period cannot exceed a
proportion of the expectation of tomorrows value of todays stock of housing:
Et
RSPt
SPt+1
bcvt  kSPtEtqSPt+1Hcvt ; (12)
Et
RSPt
SPt+1
bcft  kSPtEtqSPt+1Hcft ; (13)
where equations (12) and (13) represent the collateral constraint for the variable- and xed-rate borrower,
respectively. kSPt can be interpreted as the loan-to-value ratio in SP. Notice that such models with
collateral constraints, the LTV is typically considered exogenous. At the macroeconomic level, LTVs
partly depend on exogenous factors such as regulation. This parameter is usually calibrated to match
the average LTV in the country analyzed. However, in this model, it can vary depending on economic
conditions, as a macroprudential policy variable. As we will see when we introduce the problem of
the nancial intermediary, RSPt is an aggregate interest rate that contains information on all the past
xed-interest rates associated with past debt. Each period, this aggregate interest rate is updated with
a new interest rate linked to the new amount of debt originating in that period.
Without loss of generality, we present the problem for the variable-rate borrower since that for the
xed rate is symmetrical. Variable-rate borrowers maximize their lifetime utility function:
max E0
1X
t=0
etlnCcvt + j lnHcvt   (Lcvt )

; (14)
where Ccvt = (C
cv
SPt)
n (CcvEURt)
1 n ; Lcvt =
h
(Lcvct )
1  + (Lcvht)
1 
i 1
1 
; subject to the budget constraint
(in terms of good A):
CcvSPt +
PEURt
PSPt
CcvEURt + qSPtH
cv
t +
RSPt 1bcvt 1
SPt
 qSPtHcvt 1 + wcvctLcvct + wcvhtLcvt + bcvht; (15)
and subject to the collateral constraint (12). Notice that variable-rate borrowers repay all debt every
period and acquire new debt at the current new interest rate. This assumption implies that the interest
rate on variable-rate mortgages is revised every period for the whole stock of debt and changed according
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to the policy rate.16 To make the problem for xed-rate borrowers symmetrical and analogous to
existing models with borrowing constraints, we assume the same debt-repayment structure for this type
of borrower. Obviously, xed-rate contracts are not revised every period. However, to make the model
more realistic, but still tractable, the xed-interest rate will be such that a revised xed rate will be
applied only on new debt, keeping constant the interest rate applied to existing debt. In this way, we
reconcile the structure of the model with the fact that xed-rate contracts are long term.17
The rst-order conditions for these consumers are as follows:
CcvSPt
CcvEURt
=
nPEURt
(1  n)PSPt (16)
n
CcvSPt
= eEt nRSPt
SPt+1CcvSPt+1

+ cvt RSPt; (17)
wcvct = (L
cv
t )
 1 (Lcvct )
 
h
(Lcvct )
1  + (Lcvht)
1 
i 
1  CcvSPt
n
; (18)
wcvht = (L
cv
t )
 1 (Lcvht)
 
h
(Lcvct )
1  + (Lcvht)
1 
i 
1  CcvSPt
n
; (19)
j
Hcvt
=
n
CcvSPt
qSPt   eEt n
CcvSPt+1
qSPt+1   cvt kSPtEtqSPt+1SPt+1: (20)
These rst-order conditions di¤er from those of unconstrained individuals. In the case of constrained
consumers, the Lagrange multiplier on the borrowing constraint (cvt ) appears in equations (17) and
(20). As in Iacoviello (2005), the borrowing constraint is always binding, so that constrained individuals
borrow the maximum amount they are allowed, and their saving is zero.18
The problem for consumers is analogous in EUR.
16This assumption is consistent with reality, in which variable-interest rates are revised very frequently and changed
according to an interest-rate index tied to the interest rate set by the central bank.
17Another option would be to have an overlapping generation model in which we are able to keep track of the debt issued
each period. However, the model would become more complex and less comparable with the standard collateral constraint
DSGE models, such as that of Iacoviello (2005).
18From the Euler equations for consumption of the unconstrained consumers, we know that RSP = 1= , where variables
without a time subscript denote steady-state variables. If we combine this result with the Euler equation for consumption
for the constrained individual, we have cv = n

   e =CcvSP > 0. Given that  > e, the borrowing constraint holds with
equality in steady state. Since the model is log-linearized around the steady state and low uncertainty is assumed, this
result can be generalized to o¤-steady-state dynamics.
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3.2 The Financial Intermediary
We assume a competitive framework, and thus the intermediary takes the variable interest rate as given.19
The prots of the nancial intermediary are dened as:20
Ft = SPRSPt 1bcvt 1 + (1  SP )RSPt 1bcft 1  RSPt 1but 1; (21)
where Ft are the prots of the nancial intermediary. RSPt and RSPt are the variable and the xed
rate, respectively.
In equilibrium, aggregate borrowing and saving must be equal, that is,
SP b
cv
t + (1  SP ) bcft = but : (22)
Substituting (22) into (21), we obtain,
Ft = (1  SP ) bcft 1
 
RSPt 1  RSPt 1

: (23)
For the two types of mortgage to be o¤ered, the xed-interest rate has to be such that the intermediary
is indi¤erent between lending at a variable or xed rate. Hence, the expected discounted prots that the
intermediary obtains by lending new debt in a given period at a xed-interest rate must be equal to the
expected discounted prots the intermediary would obtain by lending it at a variable rate:
E
1X
i=+1
i ;iRSP
OPT
 = E
1X
i=+1
i ;iRSPt 1; (24)
where t;i =
CuSPt
CuSPt+i
is the unconstrained-consumer relevant discount factor. Since the nancial inter-
mediary is owned by the savers, their stochastic discount factor is applied to the nancial intermediarys
problem. Notice that, as stated before, variable-rate debt is in one period, but the portion of new debt
acquired at a xed rate is associated with a long-term contract. Since the agent is innitely lived, we
assume here that the maturity of xed-rate mortgages is also innity.
We can obtain the equilibrium value of the xed rate in period  from expression (24) :
19See Andrés and Arce (2008) for a housing model with collateral constraints in which banks are imperfectly competitive
and are able to set optimal lending rates.
20The superscript cv signies "constrained variable," cf "constrained xed".
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R
OPT
SP =
E
1P
i=+1
i ;iRSPt 1
E
1P
i=+1
i ;i
: (25)
Equation (25) states that for every new debt issued at date  , there is a di¤erent xed-interest rate
that has to be equal to a discounted average of future variable-interest rates. Notice that this is not a
condition on the stock of debt, but on the new amount obtained in a given period. New debt at a given
point in time is associated with a di¤erent xed-interest rate. Both the xed-interest rate in period 
and the new amount of debt in period  are xed for all future periods. Nevertheless, the xed-interest
rate varies with the date the debt was issued, so that in every period there is a new xed-interest rate
associated with new debt in this period. If we consider xed-rate loans to be long term, the nancial
intermediary obtains interest payments every period from the whole stock of debt, not only from the
new ones. Hence, we can dene an aggregate xed-interest rate as the one the nancial intermediary
e¤ectively charges every period for the whole stock of mortgages. This aggregate xed-interest rate is
composed of all past xed-interest rates and past debt, together with the current-period equilibrium
xed-interest rate and new amount of debt. Therefore, the e¤ective xed-interest rate that the nancial
intermediary charges for the stock of xed-rate debt every period is as follows:
RSPt =
8><>:
RSPt 1b
cf
t 1+R
OPT
SPt

bcft  bcft 1

bcft
if bcft > b
cf
t 1
RSPt 1 if b
cf
t  bcft 1
9>=>; : (26)
Equation (26) states that the xed-interest rate that the nancial intermediary charges today is an
average of what it charged the previous period for the previous stock of mortgages and what it charges
in the current period for the new amount. If there is no new debt, the xed-interest rate will be equal
to that of the previous period. Then, in the same way that variable rates are revised every period,
xed-rates are revised by including the new optimal xed-interest rate for the new debt originating in
this period. Importantly, this assumption is not crucial for results. Both R
OPT
SP and RSPt are practically
una¤ected by interest rate shocks.21 This assumption is a way to make the model compatible with the
fact that xed-rate loans are not one-period assets but longer-term ones.
As noted above, any prots from nancial intermediation are rebated to the unconstrained consumers
every period. Even if the nancial intermediary is competitive and does not make prots in the absence
21 In log-linearized terms, the new xed interest rate is always equal to the past xed interest rate, therefore, equation
(26) does not introduce a kink.
13
of shocks; should a shock occur, the fact that only the variable-interest rate is directly a¤ected can
generate non-zero prots.22
The nancial intermediary problem for EUR is symmetrical.
3.3 Firms
3.3.1 Final-Consumption Goods Producers
In SP, there is a continuum of nal-goods producers that aggregate intermediate goods according to the
production function:
Y kSPt =
Z 1
0
Y kSPt (z)
" 1
" dz
 "
" 1
; (27)
where " > 1 is the elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods.
The total demand of intermediate-good z is given by YSPt (z) =

PSP (z)
PSPt
 "
YSPt; and the price index
is PSPt =
hR 1
0 PSPt (z)
1 " dz
i 1
" 1
:
3.3.2 Intermediate-Goods and House Producers
The intermediate-goods consumption market is monopolistically competitive. Following Iacoviello (2005),
intermediate goods are produced according to the following production function:
YSPt (z) = t (L
u
ct (z))
 (Lcct (z))
(1 ) ; (28)
where t represents technology. We assume that log t =  log t 1 + ut, where  is the autoregressive
coe¢ cient and ut is a normally distributed shock to technology.  2 [0; 1] measures the relative size
of each group in terms of labor. Lct is labor supplied by constrained consumers, dened as SPL
cv
t +
(1  SP )Lcft .
Symmetry across rms allows avoiding index z and re-writing equation (28) as:
YSPt = t (L
u
ct)
 (Lcct)
(1 ) ; (29)
The production function for housing investment is as follows:
22This modelling of the xed interest rate follows Rubio (2011) and Rubio (2014).
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ISPt = t (L
u
ht)
 (Lcht)
(1 ) ; (30)
Producers maximize prots:
max
Lct;Lht
YSPt
Xt
+ qtISPt   wuctLuct   wuhtLuht   wcvctLcvct   wcvhtLcvt   wcfct Lcfct   wcfhtLcft : (31)
The rst-order conditions for labor demand are the following:
wuct =
1
Xt

YSPt
Luct
; (32)
wcvct = w
cf
ct =
1
Xt
(1  ) YSPt
Lcct
; (33)
wuht = 
qtISPt
Luht
; (34)
wcvht = w
cf
ht = (1  )
qtISPt
Lcht
; (35)
where Xt is the markup, or the inverse of marginal cost.
The price-setting problem for the intermediate-goods producers is a standard Calvo-Yun case. An
intermediate-goods producer sells goods at price PSPt (z) ; and 1   is the probability of being able to
change the sale price in every period. The optimal reset price POPTSPt (z) solves the following:
1X
k=0
()k Et

t;k

POPTSPt (z)
PSPt+k
  "= ("  1)
Xt+k

Y OPTSPt+k (z)

= 0: (36)
The aggregate price level is given as follows:
PSPt =
h
P 1 "SPt 1 + (1  )
 
POPTSPt
1 "i1=(1 ")
: (37)
Using (36) and (37) and log-linearizing, we can obtain the standard forward-looking Phillips curve.23
The rm problem is similar in EUR.
23This Phillips curve is consistent with other two-country models with nancial accelerator. See for instance Gilchrist et
al (2002) or Iacoviello and Smets (2006).
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3.4 Aggregate Variables and Market Clearing
Given SP ; the fraction of variable-rate borrowers in SP, we can dene aggregates across constrained
consumers as the sum of variable-rate and xed-rate aggregates, so that Cct  SPCcvt + (1  SP )Ccft ;
Hct  SPHcvt + (1  SP )Hcft and bct  SP bcvt + (1  SP ) bcft :
Therefore, economy-wide aggregates in Country SP are Ct  Cut + Cct , Lt  Lut + Lct . Domestic
housing market clearing requires ISPt 
 
Hut  Hut 1

+
 
Hct  Hct 1

:
The market clearing condition for the nal good in Country SP is nYSPt = nCSPt + (1  n)CSPt +
n 2 d
2
t . Domestic nancial markets clear: b
c
t = b
u
t : The world bond market clearing condition is ndt +
(1  n) PEURtPSPt dt = 0; where dt denotes the foreign bonds in real terms. The net foreign asset position
follows dt =
Rt 1
(1  dt)SPtdt 1 + YSPt   CSPt  
PEURt
PSPt
CEURt. Everything is similar in EUR.
3.5 Monetary Policy
The model is closed with a Taylor rule, with interest-rate smoothing for interest-rate setting by a single
central bank,24
Rt = (Rt 1)
h
(SPt)
n (EURt)
(1 n)
i(1+)
R
1 
"R;t; (38)
0    1 is the parameter associated with interest-rate inertia. (1 + ) measures the sensitivity of
interest rates to current ination. "R;t is a white noise shock process with zero mean and variance 2" .
This rule is consistent with the primary objective of the ECB being price stability.
4 Dynamics
In this section, we simulate the model to illustrate the economic situation that preceded the crisis in
Spain. We show, within the model, the e¤ects and the mechanisms that follow after a negative interest-
rate shock, a positive productivity shock in the Euro area that leads to a reduction in interest rates, and
a housing demand shock in Spain. We consider that these are the three economic events that led to a
housing and credit boom in Spain. We study these shocks one by one to disentangle the specic e¤ects
that each of them had on the pre-crisis Spanish economy. In particular, we study the e¤ects on GDP, as
24This type of rule is also used in other monetary-union models. See Iacoviello and Smets (2006) or Aspachs and Rabanal
(2008). Furthermore, as shown in Iacoviello (2005) and Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2014), a rule that only responds to
ination enhances the nancial accelerator.
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dened by internal consumption plus exports; consumption, dened as internal demand, that is, internal
consumption plus imports; house prices; borrowing; the Euro area interest rate; and CPI ination.
4.1 Parameter Values
Parameters are calibrated to reect the economy of Spain and the rest of the Euro area. Some of
the parameters are standard and are common for both economies and some others will be specically
calibrated for each country. Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix present a summary of the parameter
values.
Discount factors are set to be common in both economies, following the standard values in the
literature. The discount factor for savers, , is set to 0:99 so that the annual interest rate is 4% in steady
state. The discount factor for borrowers, e, is set to 0:98.25 The steady-state weight of housing in the
utility function, j, is set to 0:12 and 0:143, in the Euro area and Spain, respectively. This parameter
pins down the ratio of housing wealth to GDP.26 We set  = 2, implying a value of the labor supply
elasticity of 1:27 Following Horvath (2000) and Iacoviello and Neri (2010), we set the inverse elasticity of
substitution across hours in the two sectors to one:For the loan-to-value ratio we consider a steady-state
value of 0.67 and 0.80, for the Euro area and Spain, respectively, taking the average LTV ratio observed
in the data.28 The labor-income share of unconstrained consumers, , is set to 0:7.29 We pick a value of 6
for ", the elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods. This value implies a steady-state markup
of 1:2. The probability of not changing prices, , is set to 0:75, implying that prices change every four
quarters on average. For the Taylor Rule parameters, we use  = 0:8,  = 0:5: The rst value reects a
realistic degree of interest-rate smoothing.30  is consistent with the original parameters proposed by
Taylor in 1993. We consider , the proportion of variable-rate mortgages, to be 0.35 and 0.75, in the
Euro area and Spain, respectively. The size of Spain is considered to be 10%.31 A technology shock is a
1% positive technology with 0.9 persistence.32 Tables A3 and A4 in the Appendix present some of the
25Lawrance (1991) estimated discount factors for poor consumers at between 0:95 and 0:98 at quarterly frequency.
26Following Aspachs and Rabanal (2008), I use 1.40, value that reects the ratio of housing wealth to GDP across most
industrialized countries as a proxy for the Euro area. For Spain, this parameter is calibrated in Ortega et al. (2011).
27Microeconomic estimates usually suggest values in the range of 0 and 0.5 (for males). Domeij and Flodén (2006) showed
that in the presence of borrowing constraints this estimate could have a downward bias of 50%.
28We use 0.675 for the loan-to-value ratio,consistently with data from the European Mortgage Federation (Spain Factsheet
2009)
29This value is in the range of the estimates of Iacoviello (2005) and Iacoviello and Neri (2010) for the US, and Campbell
and Mankiw (1991) for the US, Canada, France, and Sweden. Therefore, I take it as valid for most of the countries of the
Euro area.
30See McCallum (2001).
31We follow Andres et al. (2010).
32This high persistence value for technology shocks is consistent with what is commonly reported in the literature. Smets
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Figure 1: Impulse Responses to an Interest rate shock in the Euro area. Spain versus rest of the Euro
zone.
data used for calibration.33
4.2 Impulse Responses
4.2.1 Impulse responses to a negative interest-rate shock
The ECB and other central banks, previous to the crisis, implemented unprecedented loose monetary
policies. Interest rates were at a very low levels and this caused credit to grow. In this section, we proxy
this ECB policy as a negative interest-rate shock. In Figure 1, we see that loose credit conditions in
the Euro area lead to an increase in borrowing, especially in Spain. The reason why this credit growth
was stronger in Spain is mainly because the structure of mortgage contracts in this economy, variable
rates, and the fact that LTV were also higher than the European average. These two characteristics
of the Spanish economy made Spanish households more sensitive to changes in interest rates, due to a
stronger pass-through of the policy rate and a stronger nancial accelerator e¤ects. Nevertheless, these
facts alone could not explain the di¤erences in house price growths that we observed between Spain and
the core countries in the Euro area. The negative interest-rate shock causes a common demand shock
in those two areas but it exacerbates the credit boom in Spain without translating to a house price
and Wouters (2002) estimated a value of 0.822 for this parameter in Europe; Iacoviello and Neri (2010) estimated it as 0.93
for the US.
33Results are robust to the country size and the persistence of the technology shock.
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Figure 2: Impulse Responses to a Productivity Shock in the rest of the Euro area. Spain versus rest of
Euro zone.
boom which is stronger than in the case of its partners. In terms of consumption, demand increases in
both countries due to the lower interest rates and slightly more in Spain because Spanish households
are borrowing by more than in the rest of the Euro area. GDP is increasing by more in the Euro area
because this is the country that is absorbing the increase in demand and producing more for internal
and external demand.
4.2.2 Impulse Responses to a Technology Shock in EUR
Figure 2 illustrates another factor that contributed to the credit boom in Spain previous to the crisis.
Productivity di¤erentials between Spain and its European partners increased after the launch of the
Euro. The rest of the Euro area (i.e. Germany and the core countries) was having a productivity shock
that increased output and decreased ination. Lower ination rates in the core countries, which have
a higher weight in the Taylor rule, made the systematic component of the policy rule respond lowering
interest rates. The decrease in the interest rate, in the context of the monetary union, was common
to Spain as well. Spain was not benetting from a productivity shock but it was transmitted to this
country in the form of lower interest rates, loosening credit conditions. Thus, a supply shock in the Euro
area became a demand shock in Spain, due to lower interest rates. Therefore, consumption in Spain
also increased, as in the rest of the Euro area but at the expense of higher ination and a credit boom
that was stronger than in the core countries. However, as in the case of the previous shock, loose credit
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Figure 3: Impulse Responses to a Housing Demand Shock in Spain. Spain versus rest of the Euro zone.
conditions can explain a stronger credit boom in Spain but not a higher house price growth than in the
rest of the Euro area. Also as in the previous case, the Euro area absorbed the increase in demand for
consumer goods that happened in both countries.
4.2.3 Impulse Responses to a Housing Demand Shock in SP
In order to explain the higher house price growth in Spain, we assume that Spain su¤ered a housing
demand shock that was translated to higher house prices. Figure 3 illustrates the e¤ect of this shock.
We see that an increase in the preference for houses produces an increase in housing prices in Spain.
Since the value of the collateral is higher in Spain, borrowing increases, creating a credit boom. Even if
the three shocks analyzed create a credit boom that is higher in Spain, this is the shock that can explain
the higher increase in house prices in this country, as compared to its European partners.
5 Macroprudential Policy
As an approximation for a realistic macroprudential policy, we consider a Taylor-type rule for the loan-
to-value ratio. In standard models, the LTV ratio is a xed parameter which is not a¤ected by economic
conditions. However, we can think of regulations of LTV ratios as a way to moderate credit booms.
When the LTV ratio is high, the collateral constraint is less tight. And, since the constraint is binding,
borrowers will borrow as much as they are allowed to. Lowering the LTV tightens the constraint and
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therefore restricts the loans that borrowers can obtain. Recent research on macroprudential policies
has proposed Taylor-type rules for the LTV ratio so that it reacts inversely to variables such that the
growth rates of GDP, credit, the credit-to-GDP ratio or house prices. These rules can be a simple
illustration of how a macroprudential policy could work in practice. Here, we assume that there exists
a macroprudential Taylor-type rule for the LTV ratio in Spain, so that it responds to output and
house prices.34 The rst variable would correspond to the objective of the macroprudential regulator to
moderate booms in the economy that could lead to an excessive credit growth. As for the house prices,
given collateral constraints, they are the key causal variable for the dynamics of loans to households,
and it appears to correspond to the actual behavior of policymakers.35 We consider a decentralized
macroprudential policy in which each country can implement its own rule:
kSPt = kSS_SP

qSPt
qSP
 kq YSPt
YSP
 kY
; (39)
where kSS_SP ; qSP and YSP are the steady-state values for the loan-to-value ratio, house prices and
output in Spain. kq  0; kY  0 measure the response of the loan-to-value to deviations of housing and
output from their steady state. This kind of rule would be countercyclical, delivering a lower LTV ratio
in booms, therefore restricting the credit in the economy.
In order to nd the optimal macroprudential policy, we consider the values of the rule parameters
that maximize welfare for Spain. The following subsection describes the welfare measure.
5.1 Welfare Measure
In order to provide a measure for welfare, we numerically evaluate how cross-country asymmetries a¤ect
welfare for a given policy rule and for technology shocks. As discussed in Benigno and Woodford (2008),
the two approaches that have recently been used for welfare analysis in DSGE models include either
characterizing the optimal Ramsey policy, or solving the model using a second-order approximation
to the structural equations for given policy and then evaluating welfare using this solution. As in
Mendicino and Pescatori (2007), we take this latter approach to be able to evaluate the welfare of the
three types of agents separately.36 The individual welfare for savers and borrowers in Country SP is
34 I have also experimented with rules that react directly to credit growth and results for the dynamics of the model are
similar.
35See Angelini et al. (2012) for further discussion.
36We used the software Dynare to obtain a solution for the equilibrium implied by a given policy by solving a second-order
approximation to the constraints, then evaluating welfare under the policy using this approximate solution, as in Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (2004). See Monacelli (2006) for an example of the Ramsey approach in a model with heterogeneous
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dened, respectively, as follows:
Vu;t  Et
1X
m=0
m
 
lnCut+m + j lnH
u
t+m  
 
Lut+m


!
; (40)
Vcv;t  Et
1X
m=0
em lnCcvt+m + j lnHcvt+m    Lcvt+m
!
; (41)
Following Mendicino and Pescatori (2007), we dene social welfare in SP as a weighted sum of the
individual welfare for the di¤erent types of households:
Vt = (1  )Vu;t +

1  e [AVcv;t + (1  A)Vcf;t] : (42)
Borrowers and saverswelfare are weighted by

1  e and (1  ) ; respectively, so that the two groups
receive the same level of utility from a constant consumption stream. Everything is symmetrical for
EUR.
Total welfare is dened as a weighted sum of the welfare in the two countries:
Wt = nVt + (1  n)V t : (43)
In order to make the results more intuitive, we present welfare changes in terms of consumption
equivalents. We use as a benchmark the welfare evaluated when the macroprudential policy is not active
and compare it with the welfare obtained when such policy is implemented.37
5.2 Optimal Macroprudential Policy
Table 1 presents the optimized parameters of the macroprudential rule. We take monetary policy as
given and search over the parameters that maximize welfare in Spain.
Table1: Optimal Macroprudential Policy
Optimal Parameters kq = 0:62 
k
Y = 0:03
Welfare gain 2.093
In Table 1, we nd the optimal parameters for the LTV rule described in equation 39. The rst
parameter corresponds to the reaction of the LTV to housing prices, while the second one is the output
consumers.
37We follow Ascari and Ropele (2009).
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Figure 4: Impulse Responses to Monetary, Technology and Housing Demand Shocks. LTV and Credit
in Spain. Macroprudential versus no macroprudential policy.
reaction parameter. The larger the value of this parameter, the more the LTV reacts to changes in
housing prices or output, respectively. We see that the optimal rule for Spain is one in which the
LTV mainly responds to house prices, as the main indicator of credit excesses. Therefore, it means
that whenever house prices increase, the macroprudential regulator should see this as an indication of a
housing market excess and cut the LTV accordingly.
Furthermore, in the table, we present the gains in terms of welfare that implementing this optimal
rule represents. Putting this rule in place gives a welfare gain to Spain (in consumption equivalents)
of more than 2%, with respect to a situation in which there are no macroprudential policies.38 Welfare
gains are coming from the fact that borrowers are better o¤ with macroprudential policies. Since, in
this model, the collateral constraint is always binding, borrowers are not able to smooth consumption as
savers do. Therefore, a policy that enhances nancial stability brings them a more stable scenario with
a more stable consumption path.
Figure 4 displays impulse responses for Spain with the optimized parameters found in Table . Impulse
responses are calculated for the three previous shocks; a negative interest-rate shock, a productivity shock
in the Euro area and a housing demand shock in Spain. We compare the case in which macroprudential
policies are not in place with the case of the optimal macroprudential rule. We see that if the optimal
38Notice that although this welfare gain may seem rather large, we are not optimizing over monetary policy and therefore
the starting point is a non-optimal one. Thus, when optimizing over macroprudential policies gains are large.
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macroprudential rule is implemented, the credit boom is softened due to a decrease in the LTV. In the
three cases, the shocks are generating a boom in the housing market. However, with this macroprudential
policy, the credit boom can be mitigated, which is the objective of the macroprudential regulator.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we build a two-country DSGE model, with housing, and collateral constraints in order to
illustrate the housing boom that preceded the crisis in Spain, and the e¤ects of macroprudential policies
that were implemented by the Bank of Spain. Within this setting, countries take part of a monetary
union in which monetary policy is set by a single central bank. For the case of macroprudential policies,
there is a macroprudential LTV rule in Spain that responds to deviations of house prices and output
with respect to their steady states.
This paper is novel in the sense that it studies macroprudential policies in Spain in a DSGE frame-
work. Furthermore, within this setting, it provides answers in terms of optimality and welfare gains of
an LTV rule for macroprudential purposes.
The model is appropriately calibrated to reect the Spanish economy and the rest of the Euro area.
In particular, it accounts for the higher LTVs and housing wealth in Spain, the small weight of the
country within the Euro area, as well as for the fact that the majority of mortgages in Spain are variable
rate.
In this framework, we illustrate that looser credit conditions from Spain, coming from monetary
policy shocks or lower interest rates responding to increases in productivity in the Euro area, may have
contributed to the credit boom that the Spanish economy experienced before the crisis. This, together
with a housing demand shock could explain the stronger increase in credit and house prices in Spain,
with respect to its European partners.
When we assess the optimal macroprudential policies that could have been implemented by the
central bank in order to avoid the credit boom in Spain, we nd that a countercyclical LTV rule that
mainly responds to increases in house prices, could have mitigated the credit boom. These results
could be extended to other economies with similar problems in their housing markets. Moreover, for
further research, it would be also interesting to explore the capital requirement ratio as an additional
macroprudential tool.
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Appendix
Additional Tables and Figures
Table A1: Country-Specic Parameter Values
EUR SP
j 0:12 0:143 Weight of Housing in Utility Function
k 0:68 0:8 Average loan-to-value ratio
 0:35 0:75 Degree of variability of interest rate
n 0:90 0:10 Country size
Table A2: Common Parameter Values
 :99 Discount Factor for Saverse :98 Discount Factor for Savers
 2 Parameter associated with labor elasticity
 :70 Labor-Income share for savers
" 6 Elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods
1   2 Labor elasticity of substitution across sectors
 0:8 Interest-rate smoothing in Taylor rule
 :5 Ination Parameter in Taylor rule
 0:29 Monetary shock standard error
 0:9 Technology shock persistence
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Table A3: Loan-to-value ratios
Table A4: Fixed and variable rates
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Figure A1: Interest rates in Spain (Source Bank of Spain)
Figure A2: GDP per hour worked USD, constant prices, 2005 PPPs (Source: OECD Productivity
database)
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